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and chambers of commerce lobbied vigorously for this marginally useful aircraft, reflecting their natural concern about employment. But at a time when budget deficits are undermining both our economy and the infrastructure of our society, such actions are counterproductive. Economic data show that dollars spent for defense systems produce only half as many jobs as the same amount of money spent on civilian activities. Such misguided support for the B-1 bomber is possible only because we, the citizens of the nation, permit it. Neither the unions nor the chambers of commerce understand how unnecessary the B-1 is, nor do they realize the economic and social consequences of such a vast waste of resources, and so they encourage their representatives in Congress to go along with it. It's no longer a question of controlling a military industrial complex, but rather of how to keep the United States from becoming a totally military culture - a society in which military ideas and goals are accepted unthinkingly, and every domestic and international problem is subjugated to the demands of the military system.
Pressures from the military-industrial complex, however, are not a problem for President Reagan. Not only does he accept most of the ideas of the groups that Eisenhower warned against, but he has become their most articulate spokesman, espousing an enormous buildup in American military power, especially in nuclear-war-fighting capability, while at the same time making a shambles of armscontrol efforts. What is more, his Administration is made up largely of like-minded people, so he is not apt to hear a moderating voice from within. Consider, for example, that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense are the former president and vice president, respectively, of the Bechtel Corporation, one of the largest builders of overseas complexes for the Department of Defense. And George Shultz' predecessor at the State Department, Alexander Haig, Jr. Came to the Cabinet from the position of president and chief operating officer of United Technologies, one of the principal defense contractors in the nation. This is a problem for the country, because it needs to recruit experienced people for defense-policy positions, and yet it also must have independent decision-makers if it is to avoid the present kind of runaway militarism. The pressures of the defense community only confirm and enhance this Administration's intent.
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Yet a large number of people do worry about the militarization of the nation. Two respected West Coast newspapers recently examined the influence of the weapons industry on American defense policy and had some shocking things to say. I have already referred to the San Francisco Examiner's report on the successful effort to sell the B-1 bomber. In July 1983, the Los Angeles Times published a 16-page special report entitled "Servants or Masters? " In an accompanying editorial, the newspaper said:
"Two decades ago, Dwight D. Eisenhower warned Americans not to let what he called the military-industrial complex come to dominate their lives and dictate their futures. The nation was not listening. And today a network of defense producers, the Pentagon, and Congress bends policy to its will, as he said it would, in every city, every state house, every of fice of the federal government." It went on to say, " What would surprise Eisenhower, as it does us, is the finding of the Times investigators that the military-industrial complex has burrowed so deeply into the very fabric of America without even producing reliable and affordable weapons for defense against aggression."
To help clarify this point, the three diagrams accompanying this article compare the relative sizes of the opposing nuclear weapons and delivery systems since the early days of the Cold War. Figures 1, 2 and 3 [SEE PAGE 7] show the trends of critical nuclear-weapons systems and stockpiles from the time the United States began using nuclear weapons to deter Soviet adventurism in Europe until now. I have tried to make what might be called an educated guess (chancy at best) to project future trends, based on present American programs and the assumption that the Soviet Union would attempt to match them.
In illustrating events at each end of the time period as well as some critical moments along the way, these curves show the changes in relative levels of force through the years and demonstrate the extent to which the United States has been setting the pace of the nuclear-arms race, both technically and in deployment of new weapons systems. |