I had dinner last night with Igor Usachev and we started by talking about his family and mine. At some point, about fifteen minutes later, Igor asked where things went wrong. He said that when we met in Kuznetzov's office, we were both very convinced, he thought, that something could be done and in the Soviet Union they were very pleased with the views of the New Administration and thought that this was another chance. I said that we thought so too. Igor said they felt they had done all the things Rostow and I had asked. I said they really didn't do them all, only the easy ones and he asked what I meant. I said there were three or four things - - one bad thing was Berlin, which they shouldn't push on, and the Soviet Press, which they said was only attacking Ike and was making a very bad impression; then we said the RB 47 pilot matter was of very serious concern and then said and emphasized in particular that they shouldn't push on any important issues like Berlin, since we couldn't concentrate on the domestic and foreign issues at the same time and figure out how to respond on Berlin - we just couldn't worry about both at the same time. They all understood this. We felt this was the most important problem. I said two things happened: first, the Chairman's speech on the wars of liberation, which was very disturbing and it seemed that only the wars that the Soviet Union were concerned with were legal. I said that they started the revolution, this Administration certainly didn't. When we came in it got worse, I said we tried to stop it but they were airlifting material, pilots, etc. He said they tried to stop it too and it was stopped now. Obviously they feel they have made a very good attempt to do what we asked. I said we didn't want to talk disarmament early in the game. He said they agreed and I said it seemed that they had but that in important things the situation had become not better but worse.

Then he went on to say that they were still hopeful and that their Chairman was very pleased with the meeting with President Kennedy. I said that our President didn't draw as much pleasure from the meeting.

I asked how long he was staying and he said he didn't know, but they might go back on the 5th or 6th and that there was some discussion about meeting in Moscow and he wouldn't know until that was decided. Igor's most serious concern was that they would break up before he got his shopping done. His wife wanted among other things, some lipstick.

He said that they were very surprised that we were unwilling to discuss details at the meeting here. I told him we had explained why we couldn't do it bilaterally but that we could make a great deal of progress talking about specifics relating to it. I said we didn't want to talk about their proposals. McCloy had made it very clear we weren't supposed to negotiate and he felt it would be better to talk about specifics. I said I didn't feel it was worth it to discuss their plan because it made no sense. Every time they brought out that plan I concluded that either they were playing a game or they didn't really understand the problem. They certainly hadn't tried very hard to understand what we wanted. I said that if they spent even a day trying to understand the problem they wouldn't bring forward a plan like this one. He said they kept asking us to change it in any way we wanted. I said it could only be done in a formal meeting. I said it didn't really talk about details anyway and he asked for an example. I said that on this whole question of the kind of a world which will exist after we achieve general disarmament by any route - theirs or ours - we have very strong feelings that this can only exist in a situation which is created by an international authority and a security force together with it. I said I gathered they weren't willing to talk about this. He said they were. It would have to be a UN legislative force and a standby police force. They don't want a continuing UN police force. He said you don't need one. I asked if they had one in Russia and he said they did but that was different. I said I didn't think the meeting was getting anywhere because of their position. He said it was our fault. He said he thought I seemed discouraged. I said I was but mostly about the test ban issue, because I think this is first. He said they felt after the Congo that this makes any sense. He said the neutrals will always be on our side. I asked him why. He said this is just the way it works out. Had met their control commission. One of the other things we had thought we had made changes which met other conditions. Had pulled together. Makes you think all go to same charm school. Could still do it in form of general complete disarmament. Don't need test ban system if you have disarmament. Maybe, but I don't think so. This is nonsense. I said you know we are not very close if you insist on a troika. He said that in your country the administrators could keep us from seeing. I asked that if we went to the veto wouldn't that give us that right, I said suppose the US was willing, would you accept neutral administrators? He said no. He said they objected to our always assuming that the Russians were going to cheat.. . . he says their Chairman says they are not and if he says so, why do we think they will.

Usachev usually has a way of being very aggressive. In this case he was quite subdued. I pushed him, but he didn't fight back. I said our general conclusion was they weren't interested. He asked why and I said I would rather not say what I thought, but most felt that the Chinese would probably not come along with them. He said this was nonsense. Another reason I said was that they may want to test. He said their Chairman had announced that they had new devices to test, but that still they wanted a test ban.